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Scott: When a Claim Arises Under the Bankruptcy Code

NOTE
WHEN A CLAIM ARISES UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act' in an effort
to improve the effectiveness of the United States Bankruptcy Code
("Code"). There has been an ever increasing use of chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by manufacturers in an effort to discharge undiscovered,
contingent and unmatured products liability claims.' Debtors have
proposed and sought to confirm plans establishing product liability trusts
as a means of providing equal but impaired distributions to the largest
possible pool of claimants and future claimants. The efforts by manufacturing debtors to enjoin and pay only a fraction of the measure of
compensation to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled has led
to efforts by claimants to seek rulings that pursuit of their claims outside
of the bankruptcy court are not stayed.' These conflicting positions have
led to substantial litigation over when a particular claim arises for
bankruptcy purposes and the related question of whether the claim is
subject to the automatic stay which prevents the claimant from pursuing
judicial remedies outside of the bankruptcy court.
The Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay4 is the fundamental protector
of the debtor's estate and has been considered essential to the achievement of the Code's policy of providing a breathing spell for the debtor
in possession en route to a "fresh start." The discussion of the automatic

1. II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
2. See In re Correct Mfg. Corp., 167 B.R. 458, 459 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding that
problems with manufactured equipment led Correct Manufacturing to file for bankruptcy after reports
of injuries and deaths resulting from the equipment); see also In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R.
619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (finding that Piper Aircraft filed for reorganization under chapter I with the
knowledge that future problems with their products were unavoidable), aff'd, 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla.
1994).
3. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1988); PiperAircraft, 169 B.R.
at 777; In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 927 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
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stay in this Note is confined to 42 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) 5 which operates
as a stay against the
commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title.6

While the automatic stay is very broad, it is not without limitation.
The scope of the stay and its application in a given case turns on the
definition of "claim."7 The Code defines a claim as a "right to payment,
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured."8 Accordingly, the key question in
determining whether a particular lawsuit is subject to the automatic stay
provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) is whether or not the claim arose
prior to the petition date. The Second Circuit has stated that the
legislative history of § 101(5) "surely points us in a direction, but
provides little indication of how far we should travel."9 The issue is
complicated by the interplay between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
law-non-bankruptcy law determines the nature and existence of the
right to payment, while bankruptcy law is applied to determine when that
claim arose. 0
Recently, three dominant approaches or tests have emerged and been
applied by the courts to determine when a claim arises under the Code
and the applicability of the automatic stay in a given case: the nonbankruptcy law accrual test, the pre-petition conduct test, and the prepetition relationship test."
The issue of when a claim arises is typically litigated in actions for

5.
COLLIER
6.
7.

For a more thorough discussion of the automatic stay, see 2 WILLIAM M. COLLIER,
ON BANKRUPTCY, 362.01 at 362-8 to -33 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1991).
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994).

8. Id.
9. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991).
10. In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918,931 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1988) (holding that the existence
or nonexistence of a claim should be determined by non-bankruptcy law); see also Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946).
11. See Kevin J. Saville, Note, DischargingCERCLA Liability in Bankruptcy: When Does a
Claim Arise?, 76 MINN. L. REv. 327, 338-45 (1991).
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indemnification or contribution under a contractual relationship, 2
actions for personal injury or wrongful death in the context of products
liability, 13 and actions for regulatory compliance or to impose a
14
penalty.
The use of three different tests leads to cross-contextual inconsistency and is analytically unnecessary because one coherent theory to
determine debtor liability could be used.
Part II of this Note explores the statutory framework of the Code
and argues that a coherent theoretical approach for determining when a
claim arises is needed. Part III discusses and explains the common
judicial approaches which have been employed to define when a claim
arises under the Code. Part I also analyzes the deficiencies in each one
of these approaches. Part IV proposes the following new approach which
I call the Liability Rule:
(1) A claim "arises" when the right to payment first exists, as determined by non-bankruptcy law. Except:
(2) Where the non-bankruptcy law upon which the claim is predicated
does not confer immediate access to the courts to enforce such right
because accrual depends upon an event which is incidental to the
liability, and/or which is within the control of the claimant or a third
party (i.e. when there is not an "immediate" right to payment), the
claim is said to be based upon a right to payment that is "unmatured"
or "contingent."
The Liability Rule draws from each of the three tests currently being
employed by the courts. It combines the three tests into a single coherent
approach that provides a framework which leads to consistent and logical
results in the contract, tort, and regulatory contexts.
Part IV also tests the Liability Rule against the existing case law
and demonstrate why it is the only approach that leads to predictable
results in all cases and comports with the legislative intent of the Code.

12. Acevedo v. Van Dom Plastic Mach. Co., 68 B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986).
13. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
14. United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831 (D. Minn. 1990).
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II.

A STATUTORY APPROACH TO THE FRAMING OF THE
QUESTION: WHEN DOES A CLAIM ARISE?

A.

The Broadest PossibleDefinition of
Claim: 11 U.S.C. 101(5)

In 1978 Congress implemented a wide variety of changes to the
Code including a new definition of "claim" which is currently codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). With its new definition of "claim," Congress
opted for expansive treatment, thereby eliminating the provability and
allowability requirements of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ("Act"). 5 The
legislative history of § 101(5) makes it clear that Congress intended that
all legal obligations
of the debtor be subject to administration in the
16

bankruptcy case.

The appropriate construction of § 101(5) is at the center of both the
dischargeability and automatic stay debates. 7 Much of the controversy
centers around creation of a workable definition for what constitutes a
contingent right to payment sufficient to constitute a claim.
While the concept of a contingent claim was not new in the 1978
amendments," analytical difficulties result when the classic definition
of contingent claims litigated under the Act is applied to tort and
regulatory liability. 9 The paradigmatic example of a contingent claim

15. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.1L 680, 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); BENJAMIN
wEINTRAUB & ALAN N. REsNIcK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANuAL 5.01 (1992).
16. According to the legislative history:
The effect of the definition is a significant departure from [previous] law. ... The
definition is any right to payment, whether or not reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured.... By this broadest possible definition, and by use of the term
throughout the title 11 .... the [statute] contemplate[d] that all legal obligations of the
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the
bankruptcy case. It permits the broadest possible relief in the bankruptcy court.
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266;
8. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,5807-08.
17. For a discussion of the issue in the context of dischargeability of claims, see Charles M.
Elmer, Comment, In re Chateaugay Corp.: To What Extent are Contingent Claims and Injunctive
Remedies Under CERCLA Dischargeablein Bankruptcy?, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 255 (1992);
Saville, supra note 11; Gregory A. Bibler, The Status of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Proceedings,61 AM. BANK1. L.J. 145 (1987).
18. See Elmer, supra note 17, at 274 (citing 3A WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON
BANKRupTCY § 63, at 1751-52 (James W. Moore et al. eds., 14th ed. 1975)).
19. This is not only because the definition of"clair" is broader than the definition of the term
"debt" or "claim" under the former Bankruptcy Act, WEITMAUB & RESNICK supranote 15, 5.02,
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involves a contractual claim against the debtor by a surety, indorser, or
guarantor. In this context, contingent liability becomes rooted or arises
when the guarantor contracts to pay or perform when the principal
defaults.2" The right to payment is said to be contingent because its
existence depends upon the failure of the primary obligor to meet its
obligation as the triggering event. In the absence of a Code definition
of what constitutes
a contingent claim, the courts have created a variety
2
of definitions.
The Code defines a "claim" as any right to payment regardless of
whether that right to payment is contingent, unmatured, or unliquidated.2 3 The legislative history describes the definition of a § 101(5) claim
as encompassing all legal obligations of the debtor.24 These definitions
lead to a surprisingly simple framework for understanding when a claim
exists.
A claim certainly exists when the basis for the liability is fully ripe
for adjudication or when there is an immediate "right to payment." This
occurs where the are no procedural or substantive impediments to
adjudication in non-bankruptcy court. It is axiomatic that the right to
payment exists in the contract context where the breach and damages
have occurred, in the tort context where there is a fully manifested
injury, and in the regulatory context where the release of the hazardous
substance has occurred and response costs have been incurred by the
2
agency.
However, a claim can exist prior to the time that the immediate right
to payment exists. This occurs where the claim is based upon a

but also because the types of claims most litigated under the Act were claims by parties secondarily
liable for the debtor's obligations. Elmer, supra note 17, at 275.
20. Elmer, supra note 17, at 277.
21. Id. at 276.
22. One frequently cited definition in the contract context is:
[C]laims are contingent as to liability if the debt is one which the debtor will be called
upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event which will
trigger the liability of the debtor to the alleged creditor and if such triggering event or
occurrence was one reasonably contemplated by the debtor and creditor at the time the
event giving rise to the claim occurred.
In re All Media Properties, 5 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), affldper curiam, 646 F.2d 193
(5th Cir. 1981).
23. See supra text accompanying note 7.
24. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.N.
5787, 5963, 6266.
25. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1991) ("When such costs are
incurred, EPA will unquestionably have what can fairly be called a 'right to payment.").
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contingent, unmatured, or unliquidated right to payment. 6 Under this
scenario, the claim exists before the right to payment exists because the
claim is one for a right to payment which will come into existence when
a triggering event occurs.
Accordingly, the appropriate question in determining whether a
claim exists is: At what point does the contingent or unmatured right to
payment come into existence? The reason the courts have struggled with
the issue is that they have failed to frame the question in this way and
to understand a contingent or unmatured right to payment as a "legal
obligation" ' 7 of the debtor.
The term "legal" modifies the obligation and complicates the
problem because it requires the obligation to be grounded or rooted in
non-bankruptcy law.28 Courts have had difficulty creating a workable
analytical framework because the legal grounding in any given case is
factually dependant on the substantive law which provides the basis for
the claim. 9 For instance, we look first to the substantive law of contract
to determine the issue in that context. In the environmental regulatory
context, the substantive provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 30 will be
consulted to determine the rights and obligations created by the statute.
Finally, in the tort context, we look to the substantive law upon which
allegations of tort are predicated.
The term "obligation"3 makes up the second part of the definition
and the point at which it comes into existence becomes the determinative
factor in cases involving contingent or unmatured claims. The point at
which the debtor's obligation comes into existence also must be
determined by reference to the non-bankruptcy law that grounds or roots
the obligation.
The contractual obligation undertaken by the surety or guarantor, for
example, becomes a contingent right to payment at the time that the

26. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994).
27. Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d at 1003.
28. This term is defined as "construed or governed by the rules and principles of law, in
contradistinction to rules of equity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (6th ed. 1990).
29. See, e.g., In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 931 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
31. Defined broadly, an obligation is a bond with a condition annexed and a penalty for nonfulfillment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (6th ed. 1990). It can also be defined as an obligating factor that binds one to a course of action, a formal and binding agreement with an
acknowledgment of liability, or something that one is bound to. Id.
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6

1995]

WHEN
A CLAIM
ARISES
Scott:
When
a Claim
Arises Under the Bankruptcy Code

obligation to pay in the event of a default on the part of primary obligor
occurs.32 However, in the tort context, the legal obligation does not
exist until there is an injury, even if the injury is as yet unmanifested.33
This is so because, in order for there to be an obligation that is rooted in
tort law, there must be at least some injury.34 Similarly, in the
regulatory context, the obligation exists with reference to the statute
itself. CERCLA, for example, imposes liability upon those who release
or threaten to release hazardous substances.35 Accordingly, the
obligation becomes rooted in the law at the time that the potentially
responsible party3 6 violates the constraints imposed by the statute and not
at some later time, for example, when the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") incurs response costs.37 Defining a claim in the
manner noted above strikes a balance between the legislative inten3 to
define "claim" as broadly as possible, while maintaining some rational
line-drawing ability that can provide the foundation of an analytical
framework that can be used with consistency in the contract, tort, and
regulatory contexts.
B.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and the Needfor a Judicial
Determination of When a "Claim" "Arises"

Unlike 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), which defines "claim" without reference
to timing, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) uses the petition date as a focal point
for determining the applicability of the automatic stay. Close examination
of the automatic stay provisions of 362(a)(1) provides further statutory

32. See, e.g., In re All Media Properties, 5 B.1. 126, 133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), afrdper
curiam, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981).

33. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1220
(6th Cir. 1980) (stating that it is the injury and not its discovery that makes the manufacturer liable
in the underlying tort suit), cert. denied,454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
34. The difference between the contract context and the tort context may be described as the

distinction between an obligation and a duty. An obligation implies an immediate constraint imposed
by circumstances, while a duty is more general. The duty that exists in the tort context is not
sufficiently rooted in tort law to give rise to an obligation, and it is only when a breach of that duty
results in an injury that an immediate constraint is imposed by the essential elements of tort law:

duty, breach, and injury.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
36. See id.

37. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding unincurred
CERCLA response costs to be claims where the release or threatened release occurs pre-petition).

38. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
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guidance for the determination of when a claim comes into existence.
Section 362(a)(1) is broken down into two distinct parts. First, a
petition operates as a stay against any "action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced" prior to the filing of the
petition. 4 ' This section only applies to claims that were fully ripe for
adjudication or had accrued under non-bankruptcy law prior to the
petition date. A petition operates as a stay against actions of this type
regardless of whether the actions were pending at the time of the petition.
Second, a petition operates as a stay against any action or proceeding "to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose" prior to the filing of the
petition.4' It is this broader section of the stay provision that has created
much of the debate in this developing area of law.42
The second facet of § 362(a)(1) is important because it adds a new
and important aspect to the debate with its use of the word "arise" in
connection with the petition filing date as the focal point for timing
purposes. Simply stated, "claim[s]," defined as "any right[s] to payment,"43 which "arose" prior to the filing of the petition are stayed and
those that did not are outside the scope of the automatic stay.44 Having,
already examined the meaning of "claim" and when it comes into
existence, the next task is to determine when a claim arises for the
purposes of the automatic stay.
It is fairly well settled that a claim arises when it first comes into
existence.4 5 If this is so, the statutory relationship between §§ 101(5)
and 362(a)(1) becomes apparent. A claim which is based upon an
immediate right to payment will be stayed under all circumstances where
it is fully ripe or is said to have accrued46 prior to the petition date. In

39. The author assumes that a claim arises at the same time under a given set of factual
circumstances regardless of whether the inquiry is being done to determine the scope of the stay,
issues of discharge, or issues of treatment.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) for petitions that will operate as automatic
stays.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
42. 2 HOWARD J. STEINBERG, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION §§ 12.1, 12.2 (1989).
43. II U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994).
44. The precise effect of a violation of the automatic stay in terms of whether it renders the
action or proceeding "void" or "voidable" is outside the scope of this Note.
45. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 12 B.RL 432, 433 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1981) ("The existence of a
'claim' turns on when it arose."). But see In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 169 B.R. 766, 775-76 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that post petition pre-confirmation injury gives rise to a claim which
"'arose' or is deemed to have 'arisen"' prior to the petition date).
46. Under the theory advanced, the terms "accrual" and "arise" have distinct meanings.
Specifically, "accrual" refers to the existence of an immediate right to payment under non-bankruptcy
law that also constitutes a claim under § 101(5). "Arises" refers to the definition of "claim," but
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the more difficult scenario, a contingent, unmatured, or unliquidated
claim arises at the earliest time that the legal obligation first comes into
existence, which is determined by non-bankruptcy law. It is this
determination that has given courts and commentators the most difficulty
and has led to the development of three different judicial analytical
frameworks for determining if a "claim" exists and if so when it "arose."

Ill.

EXPLORING THE EXISTING JUDICIAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
RESOLVING THE PROBLEM

Judicial attempts to provide an analytical framework for resolving
who holds a § 101(5) claim as of a given date have been created on what
seems to be an ad hoc basis with courts adopting tests that either achieve
a desired result47 or that seem to fit the facts of a particular type of
case. While three tests have clearly emerged,4" none is adequate in and
of itself. Moreover, a combination of the three is inadequate because the
ability to obtain an accurate and predicable result in a given case will
depend upon which version of which test is applied. Surprisingly, no
standards have been clearly presented indicating which test should apply
in a given substantive area much less under specific factual scenarios
within a given area.
A.

The Accrual Test

In re M. Frenville Co.49 is frequently cited as an example of a case
applying the accrual test.5 ° In Frenville, the court held that the
automatic stay did not apply to a third party cause of action against the
debtor for contribution or indemnity that could not be filed before the

unlike "accrual," relates to the contingent, unmatured, and unliquidated rights to payment that can
also constitute claims under § 101(5) despite the fact that they have not yet accrued under nonbankruptcy law.
47. Robert R. Niccolini, Note, The Voidability of Actions Taken in Violation of the Automatic
Stay: Application ofthe Information-ForcingParadigm,45 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1668 (1992) (arguing that many courts assume that the protective purposes of the stay are always "paramount"). For
a glaring example, see Rick Brand, Lawyers Square Off with Fla. Judge, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1994,
at 18 (describing how a plaintiff and her attorney faced a $250 million sanction after refusing to drop
a state court action against Piper Aircraft Corp. that was based on a post-petition crash). See Piper
Aircraft, 169 B.R. at 766.
48. These tests are the accrual test, the conduct test, and the relationship test.
49. 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985).
50. In re M. Frenville Co. has been cited 191 times. Search of LEXIS, Shepard's (Sept. 5,
1995).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

9

LAW REVIEW
HOFSTRA
[Vol.5 24:253
Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1995], Art.

petition's filing date." The court distinguished the third party action at
issue in the case from the classic example of a contingent claim in surety
relationships." The court reasoned that in the surety context the
contingent right to payment exists when the contract is signed by the
parties.53 The court further reasoned that "while federal law controls
which claims are cognizable under the Code, the threshold question of
when a right to payment ...arises 'is to be determined by reference to
state law."' 54 This accrual analysis which determines the issue by
reference to non-bankruptcy law has been urged in the mass tort and
regulatory contexts as well.5 Nevertheless, Frenville and the accrual
test have been widely criticized. 6 There are two major criticisms of the
accrual theory to determine when a claim arises. First, the courts and
commentators that have adopted the accrual test focus on the right to
payment language in § 101(5) without regard to the words that modify
it, e.g., contingent, unmatured, unliquidated 7 This focus mistakenly
leads to the conclusion that a claim comes into existence at precisely the
same moment that the right to payment accrues under non-bankruptcy
law.58 For example, the court in Frenville reasoned that non-bankruptcy
law determines the "threshold question" of when the right to payment
arises. This ignores the fact that a claim can exist before a right to
payment exists where the claim is contingent, unliquidated, or unmatured.59 Second, the accrual theory conflicts with the language and

51. Frenville,744 F.2d at 335.
52. See id. at 337.
53. See id.
54. Id. (citing Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green. 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946)).
The court in Frenvillerelied upon state procedural rules governing third party practice to determine
the issue. Frenville,744 F.2d at 335.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 836 (D. Minn. 1990)
(holding that a claim for response costs under CERCLA "arises" when the EPA expends funds as
a result of the discharge); In re Amatex Corp., 30 B.R. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 37 B.R.
613 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'don othergrounds, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985) (consulting state
law requiring manifestation of injury for accrual of cause of action in tort); Bibler, supra note 17,
at 158 (urging that a tort claim must arise at the time that it accrues under non bankruptcy law).
1988); Acevedo v. Van
56. See, e.g., In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 932 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
Dom Plastic Mach. Co., 68 B.R. 495,498 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57
B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 57 B.R. 759, 765 (S.D. Ohio
1985); Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 15, 5.02 n.8 (citing Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d
198, 203 (4th Cir. 1988)).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994).
58. See, e.g., Bibler, supra note 17, at 161 (arguing for the application of the accrual test in
the toxic tort context).
59. While the Frenvillecourt recognized the potential of a contingent right to payment in the
context of surety contract, it ruled indemnity and contribution claims with no contract to be
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obvious intent of § 362(a)(1) which stays both those proceedings which
could have been commenced pre-petition and those proceedings on a
claim which arose pre-petition, i.e., contingent or unmatured rights to
payment which existed pre-petition. 6' Accordingly, the accrual theory
would render the second and arguably the most important aspect of
§ 362(a)(1) superfluous.
Because a bankruptcy claim normally comes into existence at the
same time it accrues under non-bankruptcy law, the accrual theory works
well in most cases. However, in circumstances where acrual of the nonbankruptcy law cause of action is in some way contingent upon a future
event, the accrual theory leads to the wrong result. Delayed accrual of
the non-bankruptcy cause of action can occur in the contract, regulatory,
and mass tort contexts.
B.

The Conduct Test

To deal with the shortcomings of the accrual test many courts have
employed what has come to be known as the conduct test. A 62classic
statement of the conduct test was made in In re Johns-Manville:
Procedural and extraneous factors such as the timing of the filing of a
summons and complaint by a third party [in the case of an indemnity
claim], which is not associated with the underlying nature of the cause
of action ...simply should not determine the existence or nonexistence
of a "claim." Rather the focus should be on the time when the acts
giving rise to the alleged liability were performed.... Thus, for federal
bankruptcy purposes, a pre-petition "claim'" may well encompass a
cause of action that, under state law, was not cognizable until after the
bankruptcy petition was filed.6'

distinguishable. 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984). This crucial distinction is where the court's
reasoning derailed. The contingent right to payment in the surety context does not exist until there
is a failure of the primary obligor to perform, not at the signing of the contract, as the Frenvillecourt
decided. See Pettibone Corp. 90 B.R. at 926 (citing In re Yanks, 49 B.R. 56, 58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1985)). Accordingly, the distinction between the surety case and non-contractual indemnity case
makes little sense. See In re Food Barn Stores, No. 93-40012-2-11, 1994 WL 702640 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. Dec. 15, 1994).
60. Claims which could have been commenced pre-petition must have accrued under state law
pre-petition. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
61. Such claims cannot have accrued under state law until the triggering event occurs, whether
it is the institution of a third party action, manifestation of an injury into a disease, or incurring of
response costs in the regulatory context. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H. Robins, Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.
1988); In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 700 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
62. 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
63. Id. at 690.
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The conduct test is well suited to the mass tort context where the
pre-petition conduct on the part of the debtor causes an injury that does
not manifest itself until post-petition or post-confirmation. 4 Nevertheless, the conduct test has been applied outside the mass tort context. 65
The advantage that the conduct test has over the accrual test is that, in
keeping with the legislative intent of the Code, it allows for far more of
the debtor's legal obligations to be administered in the bankruptcy
proceeding.66 One draw-back of the conduct test is that it does not lend
itself well to line drawing on the hard cases. 67 The criticism of the
conduct test cases is that they seem to focus on the contingent, unmatured, language in the definition of "claim" without requiring that some
legal obligation must exist. It could be argued that these courts are
focusing on the pre-petition conduct of the debtor without regard to
whether that pre-petition conduct gives rise to a legal obligation on the
part of the debtor.68
The only real problem with the conduct test lies in its application
and failure to capture the essence of the problem which it purports to

64. See, e.g., Grady, 839 F.2d at 201-202 (tort claim arises "when the acts constituting the tort
of breach of warranty... occurred."); In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 111I, 1119 (7th Cir. 1983) (no
particular amount of injury is necessary to create tort liability); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. FortyEight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1223 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that there exists a clear
distinction between when bodily injury occurs and when it becomes compensable), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1109 (1981); In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(conduct in exposing employee to asbestos pre-petition gives rise to a pre-petition claim), vacated
on other grounds, 157 B.IL 220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).
65. See, e.g., In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying the conduct test analysis
to the regulatory context).
66. See criticism of accrual test suprapart III.A.
67. The potential drawback of the conduct test was considered by the Second Circuit's bridge
hypothetical:
Defining claims to include any ultimate right to payment arising from pre-petition
conduct by the debtor comports with the theoretical model of assuring that all assets of
the debtor are available to those seeking recovery for pre-petition conduct. But such an
interpretation of "claim" yields questionable results. Consider, for example, a company
that builds bridges around the world. It can estimate that of 10,000 bridges it builds, one
will fail, causing 10 deaths. Having built 10,000 bridges, it becomes insolvent and files
a petition in bankruptcy. Is there a "claim" on behalf of the 10 people who will be killed
when they drive across the one bridge that will fail someday in the future? If the only test
is whether the ultimate right to payment will arise out of the debtor's pre-petition
conduct, the future victims have a "claim.' Yet it must be obvious that enormous practical and perhaps constitutional problems would arise from recognition of such a claim.
In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991).
68. But see In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 932 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding that "[t]he
mere manufacture and sale of a defective product" does not give rise to a claim because that "act
does not give rise to liability to that ultimately injured person").
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solve.6 9 The conduct test leads to correct results in the mass tort context
not only because the pre-petition conduct in question formed the basis of
the liability, but because the contingent right to payment was created by
a confluence of conduct and injury all occurring pre-petition. The
conduct test in this context should more appropriately be called the
tortious conduct test.7" Understood this way, only the pre-petition
conduct of injuring the claimant gives rise to a claim that can be said to
be a contingent or unmatured right to payment where the triggering event
is the manifestation or discovery of the disease." Pre-petition conduct
that may cause an injury in the future, such as manufacturing bridges or
aircraft, 2 lacks significant rooting in the law absent any injury at the
time the pre-petition conduct takes place.73
C. The Relationship Test
Finally, the recent trend is toward the use of the relationship test,74
where pre-petition conduct is viewed as a threshold requirement and
further inquiry into the relationship between the debtor and the claimant
is required." The courts which apply the conduct test appear to require
some pre-petition contact, privity, impact, or exposure between the debtor
and the claimant.7 6 Not surprisingly, the courts have been unclear in
articulating what sort of relationship is required in a given context.7 7

This is so because the pre-petition relationship is only legally significant
in a given case if it gives rise to a legal obligation on the part of the

69. See Elmer, supra note 17, at 278 (stating the All Media Properties definition, but failing
to recognize the distinction between pre-petition negligent conduct giving rise to a contingent claim
and the bridge hypothetical in Chateaugay).
70. By focusing on the specific type of conduct necessary to create a legal obligation, the
courts applying the conduct test would have avoided much misunderstanding.
71. Conceived of in this way, the bridge hypothetical in Chateaugay is easily resolved. The
pre-petition conduct of building the bridge only becomes relevant if that conduct leads to an injury

pre-petition.
72. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.) (rejecting the conduct test
in the context of non-inherently injurious product and adopting the relationship test), affd, 168 B.R.
434 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
73. In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 932 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
74. This test holds that in order for a claim to exist there must, at the very least, exist some
pre-petition relationship between the debtor and the claimant. Id.
75. In re Beeter, 173 B.R. 108, 119 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).
76. See Pettibone, 90 B.R. at 931-932; PiperAircraft, 162 B.R. at 627; Lemelle v. Universal
Mfg. Corp, 18 F.3d 1268, 1276 (5th Cir. 1994) (pre-petition conduct only relevant if claimant had
some type of specific relationship with the debtor).

77. Pettibone, 90 B.R. at 932 ("[J]udicial construction of the breadth of § [101(5)] must be
based on specific fact situations in cases presented.").
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debtor at the time of the relationship. Therefore, pre-petition privity only
has legal significance in the contract context where the pre-petition
privity between the now debtor and guarantor provides the basis for the
legal obligation. The legal obligation is the contingent right to payment
which will become an immediate right to payment at the time the debtor
fails to perform.7" Likewise, the significance of a relationship involving
pre-petition exposure only applies in the tort context where the exposure
is to an inherently injurious product creating a legal obligation which is
a contingent or unmatured right to payment.7 9 In this context, the right

to payment is contingent upon manifestation of the injury which occurred
upon exposure into a disease or injury cognizable under state law. Here,
the claim appropriately exists only when the exposure occurs and the
exposure simultaneously creates the injury."0 The accrual or the
immediate right to payment exists when the contingent event, manifestation of injury, occurs. Accordingly, relationship is only relevant to the
extent that the relationship gives rise to a legal obligation. 8' However,
by focusing on the relationship between the parties, which by definition
will include a relationship at the point that the obligation comes into
existence, and not on the nature of the liability, there exists a lack of
clarity in the analytical approach to resolving the § 101(5) and
§ 362(a)(1) issue.8z The result is completely ad hoc decision making
without any grounding in the Code. 83 This type of decision making will

78. Id. (where the court expressly left open the issue of "[w]hether a party endangered by
defective product pre-petition contract privity, use, or otherwise but not injured until post- petition
has an unaccrued claim... ").
79. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 168 B.1L 434, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("There is absolutely
no evidence in the record, nor can the Court conceive of circumstances wherein a prepetition
exposure to an allegedly defective Piper aircraft or parts will result in a prepetition injury that does
not manifest itself until post-petition.").
80. But see supra text accompanying note 58.
81. See the discussion of legal obligation supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
82. Compare In re Correct Mfg. Corp., 167 B.R. 458, 459 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (explaining
that the requirement of pre-petition relationship applies whatever test is used to define liability on
a claim and holding pre-petition manufacture of product causing post-petition injury does not give
rise to a claim pre-petition) with In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 169 B.R. 766, 775 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1994) (offering a modified test looking to post-petition pre-confirmation injury to conclude that a
sufficient relationship existed pre-petition giving rise to claim which is stayed by II U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(1)).
83. See Piper Aircraft, 169 B.R. at 775 (applying the following ad hoc test to reach the
conclusion that post-petition pre-confirmation accident victims of Piper aircraft held claims that were
stayed by the automatic stay but future claimants, defined as those with injuries occurring post
confirmation, did not: "an individual has a § 101(5) claim against a debtor manufacturer if(1) events
occurring before confirmationcreate a "relationship" between the claimant and the debtor's product,
and (2) the basis for liability is the debtor's prepetition conduct in designing, manufacturing and
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continue until "a precise test applicable to the vast landscape of rights
and interests which may be within the scope of treatment in a plan of
reorganization" is articulated. 84
IV. THE LIABILITY RULE
The accrual, conduct, and relationship tests are each problematic for
the reasons discussed above. The application of these tests has led to
inconsistency because the adoption of one test may be satisfactory in a
given context, but does not fit well when the claim issues arise in a new
context. For example, the traditional concept of a contingent claim is not
easily transferable to the tort and statutory context. 85 Each test fails to
capture the essence of what is at issue regardless of the context. What is
needed is one test that can lead to predictable and logical results in the
contract, tort, and regulatory contexts. The Liability Rule can be stated
as follows:
(1)A claim "arises" when the right to payment first exists, as determined by non-bankruptcy law. Except:
(2) Where the non-bankruptcy law upon which the claim is predicated
does not confer immediate access to the Courts to enforce such right
because accrual depends upon an event which is incidental to the
liability, and/or which is within the control of the claimant or a third
party (i.e. when there is not an "immediate" right to payment), the
claim is said to be based upon a right to payment that is "unmatured'"
or "contingent."
The Liability Rule comports with the language and purpose of § 101(5)
and § 362(a)(1), allowing the broadest possible definition of "claim" in
furtherance of the fresh start policy, while also preventing the courts
from "adopt[ing] the perspective of the character in Alice in Wonderland
who opined that words meant what he intended them to mean. 86 One
way to read the Liability Rule is that it is a combination of the best parts
of the other three tests discussed above. The first part of the Liability
Rule is essentially borrowed from the accrual test's focus on nonbankruptcy law creating the rights and obligations while bankruptcy law
determines if and how those rights and obligations are to be handled in

selling the allegedly defective or dangerous product" (emphasis added)).
84. Id.
85. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1005 (2d Cir. 1991).
86. In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R. 918, 932 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988).
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the bankruptcy case. 7 So in the majority of the cases, where the breach
of contract simultaneously results in actionable damages, or in the tort
context, where the conduct causes a harm which is cognizable as a cause
of action under non-bankruptcy law at the time the conduct takes
place,8" the bankruptcy claim will "arise" when it accrues under nonbankruptcy law. The claim arises for bankruptcy purposes when the cause
of action accrues not because non-bankruptcy law controls the timing of
when a claim arises as it does under the accrual test, but because
bankruptcy law dictates that the claim is based upon an immediate right
to payment.89 It bears repeating that a claim can exist under the Code
before an immediate right to payment exists under non-bankruptcy law
because under the Code a claim can be based upon a contingent,
unmatured, or unliquidated right to payment. 90
Accordingly, under section 1 of the Liability Rule, a claim arises
when the right to payment first exists under non-bankruptcy for a
majority of the cases.
Section 2 of the Liability Rule is designed to determine under what
circumstances a claim should arise at a different time than when it
accrues under non-bankruptcy law. In other words, section 2 addresses
the "contingent and unmatured" language of § 101(5).
In the tort context a contingent or unmatured claim will arise when
there is an exposure to an inherently injurious product that causes an
injury, even if that injury is only microscopic and has yet to manifest
itself. In the surety/indemnity context a contingent claim will "arise"
before it accrues under non-bankruptcy law at the moment the primary
obligor or the indemnitor fails to perform its obligations under the
contract or commits the acts creating an obligation to a third party. In the
regulatory context, such as under CERCLA, 91 the claim will "arise" at
the time that the release or threatened release of the hazardous substance
occurs and not when response costs have been incurred. A contingent or
unmatured claim arises at a different time than the cause of action
accrues under non-bankruptcy law. Accordingly, pre-petition conduct is
only relevant if it forms the "basis for the liability."

87. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
88. This would include the bridge hypothetical in Chateaugay, the accident victims of Piper
Aircraft, and the unanswered question in Pettibone.

89. See supra text accompanying notes 17-26.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994).
91.

See supra text accompanying note 30.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss1/5

16

1995]

WHEN
A CLAIM
ARISES
Scott:
When
a Claim
Arises Under the Bankruptcy Code

A.

The Liability Rule in the Delayed Manifestation
Tort Cases

Although injury is an essential element of the liability conferring a
right to payment on a personal injury claim, manifestation or discovery
of an injury is required only to prove liability or to know of the right to
recover. Because Congress has eliminated the requirement of provability,92 manifestation is reasonably considered a "contingent" event, or a
"maturation" of the original injury. The injury itself, however, cannot be
characterized as a "contingent" event, because no tort has occurred until
the victim has suffered an injury.93 Courts employing the conduct test
have recognized that a tort is composed of two elements: (1) breach of
a duty by the tort-feasor resulting in (2) harm to a victim.94 They have
also recognized that state laws designed to toll the running of the statute
of limitations by providing a form of delayed accrual should not be
dispositive of when a claim arises for bankruptcy purposes.95
In fact, many states have adopted a "discovery rule," which delays
access to the court system to enforce tort liability until such time as the
extent of the damages can be proven (even where all of the elements of
the liability exist or are scientifically certain to occur), and thus toll the
running of the statute of limitations." By contrast, because Congress
has eliminated the requirement of "provability" in replacing the former
Bankruptcy Act with the Bankruptcy Code,97 and in light of Congress's
intention to define "claim" broadly by including "contingent" and

92. See WEINTnALTB & RESNICK, supra note 15.
93. But see In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 169 B.R. 766 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that
injury occurring only post-petition arises pre-petition if it occurs pre-confirmation).
94. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.

1980), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981) The court observed:
[lit is the injury and not its discovery that makes the manufacturer liable in the
underlying tort suit .... It should make no difference when the bodily injury happens

to become compensable ... . There exists a clear distinction between when bodily injury
occurs and when bodily injury which has occurred becomes compensable.

Id. at 1220-23.
95. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. An_, 667 F.2d 1034, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111, 1119 (7th Cir. 1984).
96. See Insurance Co. of N. Am., 633 F.2d at 1220.
97. In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993).
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"unmatured" rights to payment in the definitions of "claim," 98 there is
not a commensurate delay in the time when a "claim" arises under the
Code. 99

In contrast to the Frenville non-bankruptcy law accrual test, the
Liability Rule, used to determine whether a claim exists pre-petition, is
a perfectly logical interpretation of the meaning of claim to cover "all
legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent.' ' 1°
Without
stretching the meaning of a "right to payment"' 0 ' which
"arose ' " prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition to the point
of
absurdity, the Liability Rule affords the word "claim" its "broadest
03
possible" interpretation, as Congress intended.
Therefore, in the delayed manifestation tort context the liability rule
would yield identical results to the conduct test cases where the courts
concluded that the focus should be on the conduct forming the "basis of
10 5
the liability."'' " For example, in In re Waterman Steamship Corp.,
the court ruled that former Waterman employees who were exposed prepetition to asbestos, but manifested asbestos-related diseases only postpetition, had pre-petition claims. This decision was based on the
conclusion that "the claims arose at the moment the Asbestosis Claimants
came into contact with the asbestos."' 6 Thus, the "acts giving rise to
the alleged liability" in Waterman consisted not simply of the improper
purchase, storage or use of asbestos products, or even the employment
of individuals in situations where there was a risk of exposure to the
asbestos, but rather, the actual exposure of its employees to asbestos.'0 7
The Waterman court specifically did not hold that the claims arose

98. Id. at 928.
99. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6266.
100. See id.
101. Id.

102. Id.
103. See Kallen v. Litas, 47 B.R. 977, 982 (N.D. Il1. 1985), rev'd on other groundssub nom.
In re Brass Kettle Restaurant, 790 F.2d 574 (1986).
104. In re Johns-Manville, 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[T]he focus should be
on the time when the acts giving rise to the alleged liability were performed.... Thus, for federal
bankruptcy purposes, a pre-petition 'claim' may well encompass a cause of action that, under state
law, was not cognizable until after the bankruptcy petition was filed.").
105. 141 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated on othergrounds, 157 B.R. 220 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993).
106. Id. at 556.

107. See id. When the conduct test is understood as being focused on liability as opposed to
conduct in and of itself, it is not susceptible to the criticism of the bridge hypothetical in
Chateaugay.
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at the moment Waterman negligently employed individuals in a situation
in which there was a likelihood of exposure to asbestos, but rather "the
moment the Asbestosis Claimants came into contact with the asbestos."I ' The timing of the contact was crucial in the asbestos cases
because exposure to asbestos is inherently injurious. 9
Likewise, the court in In re A.H. Robins Co."0 applied the
conduct test in precisely the same manner as it was applied in Waterman.
Applying this definition to the A.H. Robins Co. case, the court held that
the right to payment arises at the time the Dalkon Shield claimant had
the Dalkon Shield inserted."' In affirming the bankruptcy court, the
Fourth Circuit found that the tort claim arose '"when
the acts constituting
2
the tort or breach of warranty ... occurred." "
However, in Grady, the claim arose pre-petition only because all
acts constituting the tort, including impact on the victim, had occurred
prior to the filing of the petition."' At the time of the petition, the
plaintiff's right to4 payment depended solely upon manifestation, a
contingent event.' '
The holding in In re Edge"' is also consistent with the Liability
Rule. The Edge court rested its analysis on the timing of the injury" 6
The fact that the injuries in Edge occurred at the same moment as the
tortious conduct on the part of the dentist-defendants should not obscure
the basis of the Edge holding: a tort claim arises when an injury occurs
as a result of tortious conduct." 7 Thus, because the victim's not-yetdiscovered rights existed pre-petition as a result of the pre-petition injury,
and despite the fact that these existing rights "were unmatured under
applicable state law at the time of the petition," the Edge court held that

108. Id. at 556.
109. See In re Pettibone Corp. 90 B.R. 918, 928 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1988) (discussing the
reasoning of the delayed manifestation tort cases).
I10. 63 B.R. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986), afd sub nom. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d
198 (4th Cir. 1988).
111. A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.R. at 993.
112. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1988).
113. See id. at 202-03.

114. In re Pettibone Corp., 90 B.R.918, 928 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988).
115. In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 701 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) ("[A] claim arises at the time of
the negligent act, notwithstanding that access to other courts or the running of a statute of
limitation[s] may be timed from some other point in the relationship between tortfeasor and
victim.").
116. Id.
117. Id. at 205.
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the claim arose pre-petition."8
All of the claims in these tort cases "arose" at the moment the
events forming the basis of the "right to payment" had occurred, even
though the victims in those cases did not have immediate access to nonbankruptcy courts to vindicate their "rights to payment" because the prepetition injuries were not yet "manifest" (i.e. not yet "provable").
Applying the Liability Rule to tort cases yields predictable results and
provides a rational theoretical explanation for the divergence between
state and federal law.
B.

The Liability Rule in Regulatory Contexts

In Chateaugay,"9 the court of appeals employed a mode of
analysis similar to that used in the common law tort cases cited above.
Specifically, it held that pre-petition releases of toxic chemicals by the
debtor gave rise to pre-petition claims, notwithstanding the fact that those
releases had not yet been discovered by the EPA. 20 Notably, the court
declined to hold that post-petition releases caused by the improper prepetition storage of the toxins could give rise to a pre-petition claim.'
However, the obligation in Chateaugay is statutory and bears some
similarity to the contractual obligation in the indemnity cases. In the
indemnity cases, the liability of the indemnitor to the indemnitee does
not create an immediate right of action in favor of the indemnitee until
the latter is sued by an injured third party. 22 According to the Liability
Rule in CERCLA cases, the EPA cannot sue the discharger for damages
until it actually incurs costs in cleaning up the discharge. In both
contexts, the claim arises pre-petition when the harm giving rise to the
legal obligation occurs pre-petition. Under CERCLA, the harm in
question is the pre-petition release or threatened release of toxic
substances."2 In the indemnity cases, the harm is the injury sustained
pre-petition by the third party to whom the indemnitee is vicariously
liable for the wrongful acts of the indemnitor. However, in both cases,
the event which triggers the right to sue is incidental to the obligation
and hence "contingent."

118. Pettibone, 90 B.R. at 925.
119. 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
120. Id. at 1000.
121. Id. at 1005.
122. See, e.g., In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1160 (1985).
123. In re Chateaugay, 944 F.2d at 999.
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In both contexts, once the harm creating the contingent right to
payment has occurred, the "trigger" which permits access to the courts
to enforce the obligation is within the control of the claimant (EPA) or,
in the indemnity cases, a third party. Rather than leaving the timing of
a claim to manipulation by claimants or third parties, where the only
remaining predicate for a right of access to the courts is incidental to the
basis of the liability, a "contingent" or "unmatured" claim arises.
Thus, the Liability Rule is equally applicable to the CERCLA and
indemnity cases. To the extent that the remaining condition as of the
petition date (assertion of a right by a third party or clean-up undertaken
by the EPA) is incidental to the liability caused by the harm, and to the
extent that such condition is within the control of the claimant or a third
party, a contingent or unmatured claim arises pre-petition.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Liability Rule provides a coherent and analytical approach to
resolve the issue of when contingent or unmatured claims arise under the
Code. It resolves the logical deficiencies of the current judicial approaches. These approaches often result in inconsistent and ad hoc decisions,
many of which are in direct contravention of § 101(5) and § 362(a)(1)
of the Code. Application of the Liability Rule to the leading cases in
each context provides principled results and demonstrates the analytical
strength of the Rule relative to the other three rules currently being used.
Nevertheless, the Liability Rule may raise as many new questions
and difficulties as it resolves. For example, the precise distinction
between a contingent tort claim based upon common theories of
negligence, and an action arising out of the same set of facts based upon
breach of warranty, remains unclear. The Liability Rule seems to imply
that the same transaction or occurrence could give rise to a variety of
claims, each subject to different treatment under the Code. This result
would certainly be undesirable as it would lead to the manipulation of
pleadings for the purposes of meeting the plaintiff's objectives. Such a
state of affairs would create the same uncertainty that currently exists.
Nevertheless, the Liability Rule represents the best approach in light of
the current statutory framework. Understanding what that framework
actually is and how it works is the first step in determining whether it
works the way Congress intended. During the next two years the
Bankruptcy Commission will be evaluating the current statutory
framework and making suggestions to Congress. It is the author's hope
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that Congress will address the issues raised in this Note and provide
much needed clarity to an extremely important and complex problem.
Robert J. Scott
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